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TREMORS: JUSTICE SCALIA AND PROFESSOR CLINTON
RE-SHAPE THE DEBATE OVER THE CROSS-BOUNDARY
ENFORCEMENT OF TRIBAL AND STATE JUDGMENTS
ROBERT LAURENCE*
I. INTRODUCTION
A money judgment issues forth from state court. The defendant does not pay
voluntarily. A writ of execution is returned nulla bona by the county sheriff: the
defendant owns no non-exempt property within the sheriff's jurisdiction. Upon
inquiry, the plaintiff, now the judgment creditor, discovers that all of the defendant's
property resides in Indian country.
Same scenario, opposite direction: A money judgment issues forth from tribal
court. The defendant does not pay voluntarily and has no property subject to seizure
within the jurisdiction of the tribal court.
In these ways arise the issues of the present symposium, an event, incidentally,
too narrowly named. Its given name, "Enforcing the Judgments of Tribal Courts,"
proclaims interest in only half the problem, given in the second paragraph above.
And "Full Faith and Credit," the informal moniker for these issues, is only half the
answer, as not all agree that that grand phrase is appropriately used to describe the
best approach to the problem. "The Enforcement of Tribal and State Judgments
across Reservation Boundaries" does the job better and has more snap, but never
mind. I am assured by the sponsors of the symposium that it was named not to limit
our discussion to the enforcement of tribal judgments alone, nor to limit our
proposed answers to Full Faith and Credit alone.
The delimitation to money judgments, and concomitant writs of execution, is
mine, and I suspect that others writing for this symposium issue of the New Mexico
Law Review will give their discussions a wider range and write of injunctions and
restraining orders, custody and adoption decrees, marital property settlements and
probate adjudications, delinquency decrees and extraditions-all manner of tribal
and state judgments. But money judgments are what I do, and the narrowing of my
focus to these more mundane matters does not diminish the points I wish to make
here. One does not see money judgments discussed in the news with the enthusiasm
that adoption decrees are; perhaps that is exactly why my interest lies there, away
from the spotlight.'
The parameters of the debate are well known but, while familiarity with them is
largely presumed, a short brush up seems appropriate. The approaches to the
problem as found in the law reviews are three: Full Faith and Credit, comity, and
asymmetry. 2 Full Faith and Credit requires the receiving court to treat the out-of-

* Robert A. Leflar Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas.
1. Another limitation I have made to the scope of my present discussion is to exclude federal court
judgments from consideration. For present purposes, the issues regarding federal judgments are too complex. See
generally Robert Laurence, The Role, IfAny, for the FederalCourts in the Cross-BoundaryEnforcement of Federal,
State and Tribal Money Judgments, 35 TULSA L.J. I (1999).
2. These terms are not always used as carefully as one would hope. For example, in L. Scott Gould, The
Role of Jurisdictionin the Quest for Sovereignty: Tough Love for Tribes: Rethinking Sovereignty after Atkinson
and Hicks, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 669 (2003), Mr. Gould writes, "Some states have accorded full faith and credit
to tribal court decisions," and then cites Gesinger v. Gesinger, 531 N.w.2d 17 (S.D. 1995), for that proposition.
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state judgment pretty much as it treats its own judgments. The receiving court may
inquire, if it will, into the correctness of the in personam and subject matter
jurisdiction in the rendering court,' and it may apply its own statutes of limitation
for the enforcement of judgments, and its own exemption laws with respect to
which property may be seized for enforcement purposes.' Otherwise, it must enforce
the judgment, without re-litigating the merits and without applying a public-policy
test to the underlying cause of action or judgment.6 Comity is a looser inquiry,
allowing the receiving court to remain mindful of its own community sensibilities
and to apply its own standards of procedural fairness to the judgment offered for
recognition, even while showing respect for the cross-boundary sovereign.7
As a general matter, Full Faith and Credit is a requirement imposed from above
by the U.S. Constitution upon the constituent states,8 while comity is more a matter
of the restraint that a government imposes upon itself, out of respect for its fellow
sovereign that issued the judgment whose enforcement is sought. 9 Comity applies
when a foreign-nation judgment is presented to a state court for enforcement, and
while it is probably true that most of those judgments are enforced on a daily basis
across the states, it is equally true that not all are, and fewer are enforced under a
comity regime than under Full Faith and Credit.' 0
Asymmetry describes a solution to our problem in which different tests are
applied to the different courts receiving judgments: tribal courts being asked to
enforce state court judgments must act one way, while state courts being asked to
enforce tribal judgments are required to act another." Asymmetry can be seen, on

However, Gesinger is clearly a case that applies the standards not of Full Faith and Credit but comity:
"Appellant.. .appeals from the trial court's decision to grant comity to the judgment of the Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribal Court in favor of [appellee]. We affirm." Id. at 18.
3. These rules are most clearly applicable if the defendant did not appear in the court that rendered the
judgment. If the defendant did appear and made and lost his, her, or its challenge to the court's in personam or
subject matter jurisdiction, then appeal must be made to a higher court, and collateral attack in the enforcement
action is not permitted. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963); see ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS
LAw 236-39 (4th ed. 1986). If the defendant appeared but did not challenge the court's jurisdiction, then the
challenge is deemed waived, except that challenges to the subject matter of the trial court can be made at any stage
of the litigation, but not collaterally. Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694
(1982); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940). If the defendant did not appear,
however, then challenges to the jurisdiction of the rendering court are available collaterally in the enforcement
action. Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87 (1891); see LEFLAR ET AL., supra at 237.
4. Watkins v. Conway, 385 U.S. 188 (1966).
5. See Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, § 2, 13(l) U.L.A. 155.
6. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 520 U.S. 1142 (1997).
7. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 3, at 249-53, 292-93.
8. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. It is for these constitutional origins that the phrase "Full Faith and Credit" is
usually capitalized, as it is in the document itself and here, except when quoting.
9. See LEFLAR E7 AL., supra note 3, at 249-53.
10. Id.
I1. There is a form of asymmetric comity, called "non-retaliatory comity," in which one court will enforce
ajudgment from a foreign court even though that foreign court does not enforce judgments traveling in the opposite
direction. "Retaliatory comity" is a system in which a receiving court does not judge the judgment presented for
enforcement only on its own merits, but also inquires as to the general treatment of its judgments by the rendering
court. Dr. Leflar argued against retaliation:
The doctrine of retaliation, said to be based on comity or reciprocity, was, however, set out by
the United States Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot, to deny recognition to the judgment of a
foreign court if the law of the country where the judgment was rendered would not give res
judicata effect to a corresponding American judgment. The doctrine has received scant approval
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the one hand, as the purest kind of law-professor theoretical egg-headery, never
adopted by any court anywhere. 12 Or, contrariwise, it can be seen as the best
description of the real world, as different courts go about the business of deciding
what to do with judgments presented for enforcement from abroad, with little
guidance from the Congress or the Supreme Court as to what the law should be here.
A quick mention is needed here of the guidance that the Congress and the
Supreme Court have given, because the "tremors" of the title of this article relates
to what has happened, or might happen, in those bodies, or rather what two
influential jurisprudents think can or should happen in those bodies. Those two are
Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, and Robert N. Clinton,
Foundation Professor of Law at the Arizona State University College of Law, and
before I turn to their theories, I include a self-cautionary note: I must be careful in
my attribution to those two alone of theories they present with others. I will be
discussing in some detail dicta that is found in the Court's opinion in Nevada v.
Hicks. 3 This opinion was authored by Justice Scalia, but he did not write the dicta
solely for himself; he was joined by the Chief Justice, and by Justices Kennedy,
Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. I presume that his opinion was subject to the usual
give-and-take of Supreme Court process, and that it is neither quite fair nor quite
accurate to attribute the positions presented there to Justice Scalia alone. Likewise,
Professor Clinton sometimes speaks and writes for himself alone, 4 but I will also
be drawing from work that he has done as part of a group, most notably as a member
of the Court of Appeals of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, in issuing a per curiam
to whom no individual authorship is attributed,' 5 and as one of three authors of one
of the principal casebooks in American Indian law. 16 As with Justice Scalia's
opinion in Hicks, it is not quite fair, nor quite accurate, to attribute to Professor
Clinton alone thoughts issued forth from a group of which he is a member.
Nevertheless, with respect to both men, I will do the unfair, inaccurate thing, and for
the sake of convenience speak of "Justice Scalia's opinion in Hicks," or "Professor
Clinton's position regarding section 1738," a practice I hope readers will find
neither misleading nor off-putting.
Now, where were we prior to turning my attention to where Justice Scalia and
Professor Clinton think we ought to be: The Supreme Court, for its part, has said

from commentators and is not binding on state courts. It has no appreciable tendency to induce
a change in the foreign nation's law. Most state courts reject the doctrine of retaliation, while
others have sought to limit it narrowly by applying it only when judgment in the first case was
for the plaintiff, so that a later action is barred if the prior foreign suit went in favor of the
defendant therein.
LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 3, at 250 (citing Kurt H. Nadelmann, ReprisalsAgainst American Judgments?,65 HARv.
L. REV. 1184 (1952)).
12. See Robert Laurence, The Bothersome Need for Asymmetry in Any Federally Dictated Rule of
Recognition for the Enforcement of Money Judgments Across Indian Reservation Boundaries, 27 CONN. L. REV.
979 (1995).
13. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
14. Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clausefor Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 111
(2002) [hereinafter Clinton, No Federal Supremacy Clause]; Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal
Union, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 841 (1990) [hereinafter Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union].
15. Eberhard v. Eberhard, 24 Ind. L. Rep. 6059 (Cheyenne River Sioux 1997) (per curiam).
16.

ed. 2003).

ROBERT N. CLINTON Er AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL'SYSTEM (4th
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very little about the cross-boundary enforcement of tribal and state judgments. It
once held in United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe 17 that letters of administration
from a Cherokee court were entitled to recognition by the District of Columbia
Orphan's Court, under a now-repealed statute. 8 And it has said, in more recent dicta
citing Mackey, that Full Faith and Credit may be applicable to state recognition of
tribal court judgments.' 9 The analysis in Mackey now seems antique, based as it is
on a characterization of the Cherokee Nation as a "territory" of the United States,2 °
and the dicta of Martinez, based on such antique analysis, is not very persuasive. So
it seems fair to say that the Supreme Court has left the courts below, both state and
federal, with a clean Full Faith and Credit slate upon which to write. 2'
With respect to congressional action on our problem up to now, there is more.
Several times has the Congress enacted specific, narrow, and unambiguous statutes
requiring cross-boundary enforcement of state and tribal judgments.22 Of more
interest here, though, is 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the general Full Faith and Credit statute,
one of our country's earliest laws.23 Section 1738 does not mention Indian tribes, but
a few courts have found, consistent with Mackey, that tribes are subsumed under the
category "territories" of the United States,24 analysis characterized just above as
ancient, and that will not stand careful analysis.25 More to the point of the discussion
that follows, Professor Clinton, constructing a careful and elaborate argument, for
many years presented the case that this statute requires both that tribal courts enforce
state court judgments, and that state courts enforce tribal court judgments,

17. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1856).
18. Id. (citing Act of 24th of June, 1812, § 11).
19. "Judgments of tribal courts, as to matters properly within their jurisdiction, have been regarded in some
circumstances as entitled to full faith and credit in other courts." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 66
n.21 (1978) (citing United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1856)).
20. Mackey, 59 U.S. at 103. Mackey's reasoning is entirely inconsistent with United States v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313 (1978), which held that the United States and the Navajo Nation were independent sovereigns, so that each
could prosecute Mr. Wheeler for the same crime without running afoul of double jeopardy protections. Id. at 338.
Such would not be permitted if the tribe were a "territory" of the United States. Id. at 320.
21. But see Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895 (Idaho 1982) (finding Mackey and Martinez to be binding
precedent); Eberhard v. Eberhard, 24 Ind. L. Rep. 6059 (Cheyenne River Sioux 1997) (per curiam) (finding that
"Congress was not writing on a clean slate in the area of full faith and credit").
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (Violence Against Women Act); 25 U.S.C. § 1725(g) (Maine Indian Claims
Settlement Act); 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (d) (Indian Child Welfare Act); 25 U.S.C. § 2207 (Indian Land Consolidation
Act); 25 U.S.C. § 3106 (National Indian Forest Resources Management Act); 25 U.S.C. § 3713 (American Indian
Agricultural Resource Management Act). Another statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B, The Full Faith and Credit for Child
Support Orders Act, uses the term "Indian Country" where it should have used "Indian Tribe," but nonetheless is
pretty unambiguous.
23. The initial version of this statute was enacted in 1790. See LEFLAR Er AL., supra note 3, at 216 n.3.
24. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895 (Idaho 1982); Jim v. CIT Fin. Serv. Corp., 87 N.M. 362,
533 P.2d 751 (1975); Halwood v. Cowboy Auto Sales, Inc., 124 NM. 77, 946 P.2d 1088 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
There is also a series of nineteenth century Eighth Circuit cases applying Full Faith and Credit to tribal court orders,
see, e.g., Raymond v. Raymond, 83 F. 721 (8th Cir. 1897); Corells v. Shannon, 63 F. 305 (8th Cir. 1894); Mehlin
v. Ice, 56 F. 12 (8th Cir. 1893). Cases to the contrary are collected in Eberhardv.Eberhard,24 Ind. L. Rep. 6059,
6065 n.3 (Cheyenne River Sioux 1997) (per curiam).
25. Not only is such an inclusion inconsistent with Wheeler, see supra note 20, but under the doctrine of
University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986), the interpretation of section 1738 should lead a court to the
question of which courts the Congress had in mind when it enacted the statute in 1790. There is no good evidence
that judgment-issuing tribal courts existed at that time. See generally Robert Laurence, The Enforcement of
Judgments across Indian Reservation Boundaries: Full Faith and Credit, Comity and the Indian Civil Rights Act,
69 OR. L. REv. 589, 655-57 (1990).
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symmetrically and with reciprocity across reservation boundaries.26 This result
Professor Clinton sees as an imposition by Congress on the judicial discretion of
tribal and state judges, all, he insists, in the furtherance of both tribal and state
sovereignty. 21
The recently issued fourth edition of Professor Clinton's influential casebook,
American Indian Law, now authored by Professors Clinton, Goldberg, and Tsosie,
contains this interesting observation about the Clintonian theory of the application
of section 1738 to tribes. After citing some of the scholarship that has been
published with respect to the cross-boundary enforcement of tribal and state
judgments, the authors write:
In some ways, these articles focus primarily on two very different problems.
Professor Clinton is primarily concerned with assuring enforcement of tribal
judgments in federal or state courts. By contrast, most of the scholarship
advocating adoption of a comity model focuses on the obligation of tribal courts
to enforce federal or state judgments.28
Then, following a kindly citation to some of my work advocating an asymmetric
solution to these two "very different problems," the co-authors ask two questions:
"Is an asymmetrical and nonreciprocal approach likely to remain politically stable
over time? Can one model be adopted for one purpose and not for the other? ' 29 As
we shall see, these questions come even more to the forefront of the debate in light
of recent suggestions by Justice Scalia and Professor Clinton himself.
I begin with Justice Scalia.
II. JUSTICE SCALIA' S OPINION IN NEVADA V. HICKS30
Attempting to control the poaching of protected animals, Nevada game wardens
obtained two search warrants to look through the home of Floyd Hicks, a member
of the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes, and a resident on the tribes' reservation.
These warrants were obtained sequentially, and each was jointly issued by the
appropriate state and tribal courts. The game wardens, and tribal police who
accompanied them, found no incriminating evidence, and allegedly performed their
searches badly by intruding on Mr. Hicks' privacy, damaging his property, and
otherwise annoying him. He sued the state and tribal officials in tribal court.
Judgment for Mr. Hicks was affirmed on appeal to the tribal court of appeals. 3' The
state defendants then sued in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that the
tribe lacked jurisdiction, rendering the tribal judgment void. The federal district
court denied relief, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.32 The Supreme Court then
granted certiorari and reversed.

26. See Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, supra note 14; Eberhard v. Eberhard, 24 Ind. L. Rep.
6059 (Cheyenne River Sioux 1997) (per curiam); CLINTON ET AL., supra note 16, at 290-93.
27. Eberhard,24 Ind. L. Rep. at 6064.
28. CLINTON ETAL., supra note 16, at 293.
29. Id. Were I a student called upon in class to answer these questions, I think I would begin by suggesting
that "very different problems" often, not to say almost always, call for rather different solutions.
30. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
31. Id. at 357.
32. Nevada v. Hicks, 944 F. Supp 1455 (D. Nev. 1996), affd, 196 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 1999).
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The question before the Court dealt, plainly, with the jurisdiction of the tribal
court over state officials performing their official duties.33 Against the urging of the
concurring Justices, however, that he stick to this business, 34 Justice Scalia's opinion
for the Court wandered far afield, primarily, for our purposes here, into the question
of whether federal law permits the on-reservation execution of state search
warrants.35 While it would be too strong to say that the court held that the execution
36
of the search warrants was valid, that not being the issue before the court, it is not

too strong to say that Justice Scalia's opinion expressed something approaching
unqualified approval of the practice: "The State's interest in execution of process is
considerable, and even when it relates to Indian-fee lands it no more impairs the
than federal enforcement of federal law impairs state
tribe's self-government
' 37
government.
There is much to dislike in Nevada v. Hicks. And much has been written frankly
expressing that dislike. 38 Emblematic to me of the high-handedness of the analysis
is Justice Scalia's citation of the 1958 edition of the Department of the Interior's
Handbook of FederalIndian Law, a treatise that was superceded in 1981 by a later
edition.39 Rarely, one suspects, does the Court cite such an old treatise without
explaining itself. It appears that Justice Scalia either doesn't know of the later
edition, or doesn't care, for if the explanation were that he and his colleagues merely
prefer the statement of the law in the 1958 edition to the statement in the 1981
edition, then that preference would be frankly stated and justified. It is fair to say,
of course, that the Department of the Interior itself has rejected much of what is

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Hicks, 533 U.S. at 355.
Id. at 397 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 401 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 360-66.
Id. at 355.
Id. at 364.
See, e.g., Daan Braveman, Tribal Sovereignty: Them and Us, 82 OR. L. REV. 75 (2003); Frank

Pommersheim, Is There a Little (or Not So Little) ConstitutionalCrisisDeveloping in Indian Law?: A Brief Essay,
5 U. PA. J. CONST. L 271 (2003); Joseph Willam Singer, The Role of Jurisdictionin the Quest for Sovereignty:

Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court'sAttack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641 (2003); Alex
Tallchief Skibine, The Dialogic of Federalism in FederalIndian Law and the Rehnquist Court: The Need for
Coherence and Integration,8 TEx. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1 (2003); Catherine T. Struve, How Bad Law Made a Hard
Case Easy: Nevada v. Hicks and the Subject MatterJurisdictionof Tribal Courts, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 288 (2003);
Rebecca Tsosie, Tribalism, Constitutionalism,and CulturalPluralism: Where Do Indigenous Peoples Fit Within

Civil Society?, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357 (2003); Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court's Indian Law
Decisions: Deviationsfrom Constitutional Principlesand the Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J.

CONST. L. 405 (2003); Clinton, No FederalSupremacy Clause, supra note 14; Kimberly Radermacher, Comment:
ConstitutionalLaw-Indian Law: The Ongoing Divestiture by the Supreme Court of Tribal Jurisdictionover Non-

Members, On and Off the Reservation, 78 N.D. L. REV. 125 (2002); Amy Crafts, Nevada v. Hicks and Its
Implicationon American Indian Sovereignty, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1249 (2002); Philip P. Frickey, Doctrine, Context,
InstitutionalRelationships and Commentary: The Malaise of FederalIndian Law Through the Lens of Lone Wolf,
38 TULSA L. REV. 5 (2002); Melanie Reed, Native American Sovereignty Meets a Bend in the Road: Difficulties in

Nevada v. Hicks, 2002 BYU L. REV. 137; Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty
Doctrine: CulturalSovereignty andthe Collective Futureof Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 191 (2001);
David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuitof States' Rights, Color-BlindJustice and

Mainstream Values, 86 MINN.L.REV. 267 (2001); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Making Sense Out of Nevada v. Hicks:
A Reinterpretation, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 347 (2001); Rebecca Tsosie, Land, Culture, and Community:
Reflections on Native Sovereignty and Propertyin America, 34 IND. L. REV. 1291 (2001).
39. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1958), cited in Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362;
FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Rennard Strickland ed., 1982), cited in Hicks, 533 U.S. at

383-84 (Souter, J., concurring).
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found in the 1958 book,4 and, in fact, the Executive Department of the United
States was participating in Hicks, advocating the tribes' position.4
Justice Scalia's quotation from that out-dated source was careful. With internal
punctuation retained, he wrote, "'Ordinarily,' it is now clear, 'an Indian reservation
is considered part of the territory of the State. ' ' 42 Thus, the "it is now clear" is
Justice Scalia speaking, not the Department of the Interior. Justice Scalia cited no
authority for the current clarity that he now perceives in the 1958 book's forty-fiveyear-old conclusion, a conclusion offered at a time when the Executive Branch was
actively pursuing the termination policy, long since abandoned in disgrace, of
course, by that very Executive Branch.43

It is this suggestion by Justice Scalia, that Indian reservations are generally
included as part of the territory of the states, that sends a tremor through the Full
Faith and Credit debate. Even more threatening is this: "When, however, state
interests outside the reservation are implicated, States may regulate the activities
even of tribe [sic] members on tribal land ....
"44 Even more, this:
The Court's references to "process" in Utah & NorthernR. Co. [v. Fishera"],and
[UnitedStates v.1 Kagama,[4 6 ] and the Court's concern in Kagama over possible

federal encroachment on state prerogatives, suggest state authority to issue
search warrants in cases such as the one before us. ("Process" is defined as "any
means used by a court to acquire or exercise its jurisdiction over a person or over
specific property," Black's Law Dictionary 1084
(5th ed. 1979), and is equated
4
in criminal cases with a warrant (id. at 1085)). 1

Thus, the Hicks opinion intimates, state civil process runs to Indian country. And
if state civil process runs to Indian country, then it might follow that a state
judgment could be enforced on-reservation by a county sheriff seizing the
defendant's on-reservation property.48 And if the county sheriff might be permitted
to seize on-reservation property, then there would be no need for a plaintiff with a
state judgment to invoke the jurisdiction of the tribal court for enforcement
purposes. And if the plaintiff need not use the tribal court to enforce his, her, or its
judgment, then there would be no occasion for the tribal court to apply, or not, Full
Faith and Credit. If the dicta of Hicks is correct, 49 and if the dominos fall in order,

40. See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 204-24 (4th ed. 1998).
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 367.
Id. at 361-62, quoting U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 39, at 510 n.j.
The events constituting the end of the termination policy are detailed in CLINTON ET AL., supranote 16.
Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362.
116 U.S. 28 (1885).
118 U.S. 375 (1886).
Hicks, 533 U.S. at 363-64.

48. By "county sheriff' here, and elsewhere herein, I refer to an agent of the state, and of its political subdivision, the county, to which most enforcement process is assigned. I am mindful that in many places where state-

tribal affairs run smoothly, men and women are cross-deputized to be both a county deputy sheriff and a tribal
officer, thus easing many of the jurisdictional tensions that can exist. Such cooperation can only be lauded. See
Larry Cunningham, Note, Deputization of Indian Prosecutors:Protecting Indian Interests in Federal Court, 88
GEO. LJ.2187 (2000); B.J. Jones, Welcoming Tribal Courtsinto the JudicialFraternity:Emerging Issues in TribalState and Tribal-FederalCourt Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457 (1998); Philip S. Deloria, The American
Indian Law Center:An Informal History, 25 N.M. L. REV. 285 (1994).
49. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360-66.
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then the entire Full Faith and Credit debate is, at the least, changed and, at the most,
rendered moot.
Now, before analyzing and, I trust, refuting the quoted dicta, let me emphasize
just exactly how far this dicta is from the holding of Hicks. Justice Scalia stated the
holding of the Court precisely and narrowly: "Our holding in this case is limited to
the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law."50 So,
the holding is one on tribal,not state, power. True enough, this holding itself is both
wrong and wrong-headed, as has been pointed out by many scholars,5 and I will
turn to that holding later.5" Even given that Justice Scalia lost his way and ended up
writing about state power and process, he was writing about state criminal power
and process, until, quoting no source loftier than Black's, he swept his dicta even
farther to include state civil process. 53 There are many things, as I have said, wrong
with Justice Scalia's opinion in Hicks; one is that he abandoned all notions of
judicial discipline and restraint, and reverted to his prior career as law professor and
essay writer, noble enough occupations, sure, but just now Justice Scalia is being
paid to decide cases, not to write offbeat essays.
Like all dicta, the Court's statements regarding the on-reservation application of
state civil process are untrustworthy. We are interested in what a court says when
it speculates, but we do not trust such a digression because the case is not being
decided. Dicta may accurately reflect the direction the Court is going, but, then
again, it may not. We must pay attention to dicta endorsed by a majority of the
Court, and refute it when necessary, but we must do that even while making clear
that the dicta is a long, long way from the holding.
Does, or should, civil process extend to Indian country? If Williams v. Lee's
famous formulation still means anything--"Essentially, absent governing Acts of
Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." 54-then
it is hard to imagine that the Hicks dicta is correct. Indeed, Utah & Northern
55 the very case used by Justice Scalia in the Hicks dicta, 6was
Railway Co. v. Fisher,
used by the Court in Williams v. Lee to justify its infringement test, albeit with the
ever-ambiguous "Cf" signal.57
In Williams v. Lee, the Court held that Arizona lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate
a lawsuit brought by a non-Indian creditor against an Indian debtor over an onreservation transaction .58 Given that holding, the cross-boundary enforcement debate
must begin with a lawsuit between a non-Indian creditor and an Indian debtor
regarding an off-reservation transaction. Hence, state jurisdiction exists and the
judgment rendered is presumptively valid. But the infringement test must be applied
again, now with respect to the enforcement action. And does service of a writ of

50. Id. at 358.
51.

See supra note 33.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See infra text accompanying notes 68-77.
Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360-64.
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
116 U.S. 28 (1885).
Hicks, 533 U.S. 363-64.
Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
Id. at 223.
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execution and seizure of the defendant's property "infringe[] on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them"?59
Surely yes. Questions such as these arise in the enforcement of judgments: Must
the enforcement be done by a state officer, or is private enforcement permitted?6'
Must the defendant be notified in advance of the impending seizure, or is the
rendition of judgment in and of itself sufficient to warn the defendant that his
property is subject to seizure? 6' Is the property the sheriff seizes exempt and
protected from the enforcement process? 62 Must a defendant schedule certain
property as exempt prior to the execution, or may the exemption be raised postseizure? 63 Is the exemption, if applicable, waivable by the defendant and, if so, at
what time and under what procedure may such a waiver occur?' What process
follows seizure of the property and what are the required circumstances of the
sheriffs sale? 65 Does the defendant have the right to redeem the property and
recover it from the sheriff prior to the sheriff's sale? 66 And so forth.
All of these questions are traditionally answered by looking to local law, which,
in our case, would be the law of the tribe if Williams v. Lee still means what it says.67
Under the most basic notions of self-determination, it is for a tribe to decide
whether, say, automobiles should be protected from creditor process, as some states
have done 68 but not others. 69 The state in which a tribe's reservation resides may
have the same rule with respect to the exempt status of automobiles, or not; if not,
to allow the car to be seized pursuant to creditor process because the surrounding
state thinks that is proper, and in the face of a tribal exemption law to the contrary,
would surely "infringe[]70 on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them.
Far afield from the questions presented, and largely ignoring Williams v. Lee,
Justice Scalia in Hicks quoted instead from Utah & Northern Railway Co. v.
Fisher,7' to this effect: "It has, therefore, been held that process of [state] courts may
run into an Indian reservation of this kind, where the subject-matter or controversy
is otherwise within their cognizance. 72
There are so many things wrong with this quotation it is difficult to know where
to begin. In the first place, the Utah & Northern Railway Court's word "its" was
replaced by Justice Scalia with the bracketed word "state," but the sentence just

59. Id. at 220.
60. See U.C.C. § 9-609 (2000) (allowing self-help repossession by a secured creditor).
61. See, e.g., Davis v. Paschall, 640 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Ark. 1986) (holding that ajudgment debtor is entitled
to notification of execution process and distinguishing Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 266 U.S.
285 (1924)).
62. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, § 42-10-9 (2003) (exempting homesteads from creditor process).
63. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-66221 (requiring a schedule of exemptions to be filed).
64. See In re Smith, 137 B.R. 759 (Bcy. E.D. Ark. 1992) (outlining the limited occasions where homestead
may be waived).
65. See NMSA 1978, §§ 39-5-1 et seq. (2003) (setting out requirements for execution sales).
66. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-66-502 (setting time for redemption of real estate sold at a sheriffs sale).
67. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
68. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, § 42-10-1 (2003).
69. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 9, §§ 1, 2.
70. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
71. 116 U.S. 28 (1885).
72. Id. at 31, quoted in Hicks, 533 U.S. at 363 (bracketed material added by the Court).
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prior to the one quoted makes it clear that the Utah & Northern Railway Court's
reference was to the Territorial court, afederal court.7 3 To equate territorial and state
courts by the mere use of an unexplained pair of brackets shows a stunning lack of
comprehension of the basic principles of American Indian law, not to mention "Our
Federalism." 74 It is impossible to imagine that Justice Scalia did not make this
misleading substitution intentionally. Justice Scalia did not explain why he preferred
to use a case from 1885, Utah & Northern Railway, instead of Williams v. Lee, a
case from 1959. After suffering through a lengthy lecture on the workings of stare
decisis from Justice Scalia himself in Lawrence v. Texas,75 a reader is hardly
prepared for such an unexplained abandonment of precedent, especially precedent
that uses the earlier case as part of its rationale,76 in reaching the result opposite from
the Hicks dicta.77 It is also worth noting that the 1885 Utah & Northern Railway
Court cited no authority for its passive-voiced observation that "[ilt has.. .been
held...," an omission that Justice Scalia did not cure. 78 Furthermore, the sentence
from Utah & Northern Railway quoted by Justice Scalia is itself limited by the next
sentence in that old opinion: "If the plaintiff lawfully constructed and now operates
a railroad through the reservation, it is not perceived that any just rights of the
Indians under the treaty can be impaired by taxing the road and property used in
operating it."' 79 So, Utah & Northern Railway was a case involving no Indians or
Indian tribes as parties in which the Territory of Idaho was trying to enforce a tax
against a corporation whose articles of incorporation specify that it is subject to the
taxation laws of the Territory of Idaho.8" The Court sensibly held that it would not
seem to harm the tribe through whose reservation the railroad line passed, nor
violate its treaty, for the tax to be enforced. That result seems correct, and from this
case, Justice Black in Williams v. Lee found "cf." support for his famous
infringement test. From the same case, Justice Scalia instead found the authority to
practically destroy the test, and without explanation for why he thought Justice
Black had been wrong. This is not what one would call an exemplar of stare decisis
used at its best.
In short, I don't think much of Justice Scalia's misguided ipse dixit. True enough,
he may have sent a warning to those of us who have myopically debated the cross-

73. The sentence immediately preceding the one quoted by Justice Scalia says this: "The authority of the
Territory may rightfully extend to all matters not interfering with that protection." Utah & Northern Ry., 116 U.S.
at 31.
74. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). When Justice Scalia was making his bracketed
substitution, he might best have considered the following from United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978):
[A] territorial government is entirely the creation of Congress, and its judicial tribunals exert all
their powers by authority of the United States. When a territorial government enacts and enforces
criminal laws to govern its inhabitants, it is not acting as an independent political community
like a State, but as an agency of the federal government.
Id. at 321 (citations omitted).
75. 539 U.S. 558, 587 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I do not myself believe in rigid adherence to stare
decisis in constitutional cases; but I do believe that we should be consistent rather than manipulative in invoking
the doctrine.").
76. Utah & Northern Railway is cited in Williams, 258 U.S. at 220.
77.

See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 363, citing Utah & Northern Ry., which was used by Williams, 258 U.S. at 220.

78. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 363.
79.

Utah & Northern Ry., 116 U.S. at 31.

80. Id. at 28-29.
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boundary enforcement issues, that we must pay attention to the broader trends
unfolding in the Supreme Court. I had identified previously the threat posed to the
role of tribal courts in cross-boundary enforcement cases by the off-reservation
garnishment under state law of on-reservation debt,8' but I had not anticipated the
tremor to the field caused by Hicks. I await, not optimistically, the aftershocks.
Having spent the previous pages writing about the Hicks dicta, it seems almost
unnecessary to note that the holding, too, has some impact on the Full Faith and
Credit debate. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,82 Montana v. United States,83
Duro v. Reina,84 Strate v. A-i Contractors,Inc.,85 Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v.
Shirley,86 Hicks87 : yet another step along the new Trail of Tears, if it is not
disrespectful to the original event to call it that, as the Supreme Court slowly
dismantles tribal power over non-Indians who enter or live upon the reservation. Not
so slowly, actually, considering that the Court has taken apart in a quarter-century
the ability to exercise power over outsiders, a power that had been built up and
maintained for thousands of years. Not so slowly, actually, considering that the
Court has done this dismantling in a quarter-century under the federal common law
when Congress had the power to accomplish this result and did not over the entire
history of the nation.88
The Hicks Court called Montana the "pathmarking" case in this list, 89 a quaint
term, bordering on the too-precious in Indian law cases generally, but perhaps still
apt regarding Montana. Oliphantwas the first case in the disgraceful series, but that
opinion was hopelessly lost, another ipse dixit, and a precursor to Hicks, this time
from the pen of then-Justice Rehnquist. The Oliphant opinion presents another
emblematic event in late twentieth century Indian law jurisprudence: In his attempt
to establish the "unspoken assumption" of the Executive Branch that Indian tribes
had no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, Justice Rehnquist cited a 1970
opinion of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior. 90 In a footnote, Justice
Rehnquist noted that this 1970 opinion was shortly withdrawn without explanation. 9'
For many, if not most, readers, the withdrawal would be rather compelling evidence
that the Solicitor's Office ultimately concluded that the opinion was wrong, but for
Justice Rehnquist, the withdrawn opinion merits citation in the text, and the
withdrawal is consigned to the margin. The search for an "unspoken assumption"
as a basis for the Court's conclusion was bizarre enough, but to make so much of the
81. See Robert Laurence, The Off-Reservation Garnishmentof On-Reservation Debt and Related Issues in
the Cross-BoundaryEnforcement of Money Judgments, 22 AM. IND. L. REV. 355 (1998).

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

435 U.S.
450 U.S.
495 U.S.
520 U.S.
532 U.S.
533 U.S.

191
544
676
438
645
353

(1978).
(1981).
(1990).
(1997).
(2001).
(2001).

88. See Robert Laurence, The Unseemly Nature of Reservation Diminishmentby Judicial,As Opposed to
Legislative Fiat, and the Ironic Role of the Indian Civil Rights Act in Limiting Both, 71 N.D. L. REV. 393 (1995).

89. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 358. The addition of the word "pathmarking" to the Supreme Court's stylistic lexicon
is attributable to Justice Ginsburg, who first used it in International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512

U.S. 821 (1994).
90. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 201, citing CriminalJurisdictionof Indian Tribes over Non-Indians, 77 I.D. 113

(1970).
91.

Oliphant,435 U.S. at201 n.ll.
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issuance of the Solicitor's opinion and so little of its withdrawal is insulting and
shows a Justice more willing to flaunt than to camouflage his whole-cloth creation
of a new doctrine.
As the jurisdiction of tribal courts over non-members decreases, of course, so too
do the occasions for the cross-boundary enforcement of judgments become more
rare. The trail of cases mentioned above seems so long, and the Hicks dicta so
aggressively destructive, that it is not difficult to imagine a time when the crossboundary enforcement issues under discussion in this Symposium are rendered
largely theoretical. If tribal courts have jurisdiction over only their own members,
and if county sheriffs may execute judgments on-reservation-both results having
been suggested by Hicks9 2-then Full Faith and Credit, comity, and asymmetry all
become exercises in pin-head choreography.
I cling to the issue, desperately some would say, with three handholds. First, the
Hicks dicta may turn out to be unreliable and, ultimately, at least with respect to the
civil enforcement process, the Court may return to the wisdom of Williams v. Lee.
Second, when I am not doing Indian law, I do commercial law and contracts, and the
thread seems to run through all of the Oliphant-to-Hickscases diminishing tribal
authority, that contract cases between Indians and non-Indians remain within the
proper jurisdiction of the tribal courts.93 Contract litigation is not everything, but it
is substantial still, especially as cross-boundary commerce increases, and the offreservation enforcement of commercial judgments should remain a legitimate area
of inquiry. And third, following the lead of Judge William C. Canby, Jr., 94 1 long ago
abandoned the purist's position and proposed a grand compromise: that Martinez95
should be congressionally overruled and the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) 96 made
the subject of federal court civil-side review, in return for the concomitant
recognition that tribal courts have a legitimate and federally recognized interest in
all matters of on-reservation controversy, irrespective of the membership status of
the litigating parties. 97 Of course, the bargain was never mine to make, and it was
never made. One doubts that it now ever will be. The Oliphant-to-Hicks line has
made it too clear to the opponents of tribal sovereignty that the future holds mostly
good news for them; there is little left to compromise.
For the purpose of this article, however, this third handhold is useful, for it
depends for its existence on the legitimacy of Congress's enactment of the ICRA,
and, hence, more broadly to the legitimacy, or not, of the so-called plenary power
of Congress over the Indian nations. Such legitimacy is exactly the subject of
Professor Clinton's recent work, to which I now turn.
92. The first proposition is found in Hicks, 533 U.S. at 359. The second proposition is found in Hicks, 533
U.S. at 361-62.
93. From the "pathmarking" case of Montana comes this: "A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing,
or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members,
through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements." Montana, 460 U.S. at 565.
94. William C. Canby, Jr., The Status ofIndian Tribes in American Law Today, 62 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1987).
95. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
96. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2000).
97. Robert Laurence, Federal Court Review of Tribal Activity under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 68 N.D.
L. REV. 657 (1992). Early inklings can be found in Kevin Gover & Robert Laurence, Avoiding Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez: The Litigation in FederalCourt of Civil Actions under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 8 HAMLINE L. REV.

497 (1985).
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III. PROFESSOR CLINTON'S "THERE IS NO FEDERAL SUPREMACY
CLAUSE FOR INDIAN TRIBES" 98
In "There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes," Professor Robert
N. Clinton dismantled the theoretical and historical underpinnings of the so-called
"plenary power" that Congress is said to have regarding Indian affairs. He also
showed great disdain for the path taken by the federal common law regarding tribal
jurisdiction over non-members-the Oliphant-Hicksnew Trail of Tears, as I called
it above, showing my own disdain. He did not address Judge Canby's observation
that the two phenomena are linked, and that the unfortunate march of the common
law might have been arrested by a judicious use of the congressional plenary power.
But, then, few scholars do, and, as I mentioned above, it is probably too late for that
compromise to work, even if Professor Clinton would find it a suitable one, which
he probably does not.
Professor Clinton did not write in any great detail in "There Is No Federal
Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes" about the issues of cross-boundary
enforcement of state or tribal judgments. However, at the end of his discussion of
the "The Emergence of an Activist Judicial Plenary Power Doctrine from a
Judicially Conservative Court," that is of the Oliphant-Hicks line of cases,99
Professor Clinton turned his attention to the Ninth Circuit case of Wilson v.
Marchington,I°° in which the issue was the enforceability in federal court of a
money judgment from the Blackfeet Tribal Court.
The Wilson opinion divides itself into two parts. First, the court of appeals
determined that federal law did not require the Montana Federal District Court to
give Full Faith and Credit to the judgment of the tribal court. Professor Clinton
commented:
Had the judgment come from state court, the federal court, of course, would be
required under the Full Faith and Credit Act [28 U.S.C. § 1738] to give full faith
and credit to the state judgment. In a case originating in state court, § 1738
would have barred the redetermination of the subject matter jurisdiction of the
issuing court.' 0'
This statement is true, assuming that the underlying Blackfeet Tribal Court judgment
was not by default, which it was not in Wilson. 0 2 Professor Clinton continued:
Notwithstanding a prior decision of the Supreme Court, holding under [a statute
analogous to section 1738] that Indian tribal adjudications were entitled to

98. Clinton, No FederalSupremacy Clause, supranote 14.
99. Id. at 205-35. Before getting to Oliphant,Professor Clinton undertakes useful discussions of Williams
v.Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975); and Moe v. ConfederatedSalish &
Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976). Like many people, Professor Clinton considers Williams v. Lee to mark the
beginning of the modem era of federal Indian law, see Clinton, No FederalSupremacy Clause, supra note 14, at
208. Oliphant, though, in his view, marked the beginning of "[t]he growth of judicial federal plenary power." Id.
at 214. I agree.
100. 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997).
101. Clinton, No FederalSupremacy Clause, supra note 14, at 235.
102. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 807.
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recognition as judgments of a territory, the Ninth Circuit rejected full faith and
credit and applied a comity approach to enforcement of the judgment .... 03
The second part of Wilson is where the Ninth Circuit, having found itself free of
section 1738's strictures, inspected the jurisdiction of the Blackfeet Tribal Court
over the non-Indian defendant and, extending Strate v. A-] Contractors,'°4 held that
tribal power had been improperly exercised. Professor Clinton observed:
Despite the fact that a tribal member brought the tribal court case that produced
the judgment in Wilson, the Ninth Circuit found that the case was controlled by
Strate, even though in that case no tribal members were involved. The Court
virtually ignored the fact that Williams v. Lee had indicated that tribal courts
could exercise jurisdiction in cases between tribal members and non-Indians. 0 5
With that, Professor Clinton wrapped up his sharp critique of "the emerg[ing]
activist judicial plenary power doctrine":
Thus, federal judicial Indian plenary power is increasingly being used by lower
courts to prevent tribal courts from exercising jurisdiction in cases involving
non-Indians or to assure that tribal judgments in such cases are ignored. Tribes
can no longer count on federal court support for their exercises of sovereignty
and jurisdiction to protect 0their
own members from reckless non-Indian drivers
6
on their own reservations.

As should now be clear, I am with Professor Clinton on the wrongness of
Wilson's extension of Strate, which itself was an unfortunate extension of Montana,
which, in turn, was an unfortunate extension of Oliphant, which was incorrectly
decided. And I am with him, at least partially, in lamenting the role that the federal
courts, under the federal common law and without the least congressional guidance,
are creating for themselves in the destruction of tribal power over non-Indians. But,
as it should also be clear, my remedy for all of this misfortune is for Congress to
take a more active role, under its plenary power, to stop the erosion and to put this
terrible common law exactly where it ought to be-in the historical scrap heap of
bad ideas, along with the termination policy and the allotment policy.
However, the main point of "There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian
Tribes" is the dismantling of congressional power to manage Indian affairs; so it is
not at all clear that Professor Clinton would find my solution appropriate. And, more
precisely to the narrow focus of the present article, does Congress have the power,
under the very limited plenary power that Professor Clinton thinks historically,
theoretically, and constitutionally exists, to federalize the cross-boundary
enforcement of tribal and state judgments?
At no point in "There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes" did
Professor Clinton suggest that he thinks section 1738 is unconstitutional as applied
to Indian tribes. Prior to the publication of that article, he had argued many times,
in many different forums, that section 1738 not only applies to judgments crossing

103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. (citing United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1856)).
520 U.S. 438 (1997).
Clinton, No FederalSupremacy Clause, supra note 14, at 235.
Id.
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reservation boundaries, but that it applies symmetrically, that is to say that Congress
acted, initially in 1790, both to require states to enforce tribal judgments and to
require tribes to enforce state judgments.'17 He had, in fact, served as a judge on a
panel that had found, in dicta, section 1738 to be applicable to tribes, without even
mentioning them.'0 8 Eberhard was certainly a case in which Professor-there
Justice--Clinton could have expressed his opinion that section 1738 was
unconstitutional, if he thought it was.' 0 9 The truth of the matter is that Professor
Clinton had given us little advance warning of this second tremor through the crossboundary enforcement debate.
However, to be fair, I must not merely presume that Professor Clinton now thinks
that it would be unconstitutional for Congress to legislate with respect to crossboundary enforcement of state and tribal judgments, either in the form of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738, the general Full Faith and Credit statute, or 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), neither of which mentions Indian tribes, or 18
U.S.C. § 2265, the Violence against Women Act, or 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (d), the Indian
Child Welfare Act, both of which do explicitly apply to tribes. Before reading
Professor Clinton's article, I had identified our disagreement as being basic but welldefined: It was my position that the cross-boundary enforcement statutes that did not
mention tribes did not apply to tribes, and that those that did, did, and that the latter
were validly enacted under the plenary power. And, I thought that Professor
Clinton's position was that even the statutes that did not mention tribes should be
construed to reach tribes, and that all of the cross-boundary enforcement statutes
were validly enacted. Now, I find that well-defined disagreement to be thrown
asunder.
In order to discern from "There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian
Tribes" itself an answer to the question of whether Professor Clinton now thinks that
his narrowly restricted plenary power would support the enactment of a tribal-state
Full Faith and Credit Act, we must turn to the general layout of that proposed power.
The great bulk of the article demolishes the historical and theoretical bases of the
plenary power, involves itself in early constitutional and extra-constitutional
principles, and exposes the waywardness from these principles of the analysis found

107. The first statement of this position of which I am aware came in the second edition of the casebook now
called, in its fourth edition, American Indian Law: Native Nations and the Federal System, first cited supra note
16:
Does the language "in every court within the United States" in the last paragraph of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738... require tribal courts to give full faith and credit to the acts, records and judicial
proceedings of any state, territory, or possession of the United States? If so, construed, could
§ 1738 be constitutionally sustained if it did not also require federal, state, and territorial courts
to give full faith and credit to the acts, records, and judgments of tribal authorities?
MONROE PRICE & ROBERT N. CLINTON, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 357 (2d ed. 1973).

108. Eberhard v. Eberhard, 24 Ind. L. Rep. 6059, 6061 (Cheyenne River Sioux 1997) (per curiam).
109. True enough, the litigants had not raised the issue of the constitutionality, as applied to tribes, of either
section 1738, or of the narrower Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, which likewise
does not mention Indians. And true enough, too, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Court of Appeals prevented one
of the litigants in Eberhard from raising an issue that was not raised below. See Eberhard, 24 Ind. L. Rep. at 6061.
However, the Eberhard court was sufficiently concemed about the applicability of the PKPA to tribes so as to seek
supplemental filings from the litigants and from the attorney general of the tribe on that issue, id. at 6059-60, and
it appears that if, say, Justice Clinton had been similarly concerned at that time about the constitutionality of the
application of the statute to tribes, the Court could have requested briefs on this issue as well.
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in Supreme Court opinions such as United States v. Kagama,"0 Cherokee Nation v.
Southern Kansas Railway Co.,'" Stephens v. Cherokee Nation,112 Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock,' 3 Quick Bear v. Leupp," 4 and United States v. Sandoval.'"5 But one
seeking guidance with respect to which particular statutes must fall under the
principles Professor Clinton finds plain in the Framer's thoughts and writings is
confronted mostly with generalities:
" 'There simply is no basis in the United States Constitution or its legal theory
for binding Indian tribes to federal law as the supreme law of the land." 16
" "Consistent with the original American constitutional tradition, the federal
government can secure power to directly regulate ' Indian
tribes or their
7
members only through exercise of the treaty power."
• "[A reconsideration of the legitimacy of the plenary power cases] should lead
to the realization that Congress possesses only very limited power under the
Indian Commerce Clause to regulate non-Indians who deal with Indian tribes
and their members, and to manage the United States' relations with Indian
tribes....""'
" "Thus, Indian tribal courts can, and perhaps should, decline to follow both
the federal judicial plenary power cases and other federal cases purporting
to limit tribal authority and sustaining the application of broad federal
statutes to Indian tribes."".9
" "Applying a similar approach to the Indian Commerce Clause [similar to,
that is, the approach the modern Court has applied to the Interstate
Commerce Clause] suggests that this clause grants Congress no power
whatsoever to regulate Indian tribes or their members and that the exercise
of congressional Indian commerce authority is limited to nonmembers
subject to federal authority who deal with tribes and to the management of
federal relations with the tribes."' 2
Professor Clinton did not apply these general principles to specific statutes,
though at one point in the article he stated pretty unambiguously that he thinks the
Indian Civil Rights Act is unconstitutional, Santa ClaraPueblo v. Martinez to the
contrary notwithstanding.' 2' He did not analyze more difficult statutes, such as the
Indian Child Welfare Act 22 or the Violence Against Women Act.' 2 3 Nor, of course,
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114. 210 U.S. 50 (1908), discussed in Clinton, No Federal Supremacy Clause, supra note 14, at 188-89.
115. 231 U.S. 28 (1913),discussed in Clinton, No FederalSupremacy Clause, supra note 14, at 190-95.

116. Clinton, No FederalSupremacy Clause, supra note 14, at242.
117. Id. at 239.
118. Id.

119. Id.
at241.
120. Id. at254, citing United States v.Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v.Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
121. Clinton, No Federal Supremacy Clause, supra note 14, at 199 (discussing Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56-57 (1978)).
122. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963.
123. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13931 etseq.
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the various Full Faith and Credit Acts.'24 The first and second quotations given
above, though, would pretty clearly seem to declare such statutes to be invalid.
There are hints, however, here and there in the article, that cross-boundary
enforcement statutes might be treated differently under Clintonian analysis, enough
so that "There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes" is only a tremor,
not an earthquake, in the current debate. Enough so that the fairest thing to do is to
await further analysis and application by Professor Clinton himself, work that may,
in fact, be forthcoming, and may even see the light of publication before the present
essay does.125 It will not surprise the reader to discover, however, that I am impatient
and, spurred by the present symposium, rush into publication before Professor
Clinton has had a chance to explain himself.
In anticipation of his work, I note that, while the first two sentences quoted above
are rather absolute, the third sentence leaves more room for the legitimate enactment
of a Full Faith and Credit statute. In that third sentence, Professor Clinton defined
the limits of the plenary power as the "regulat[ion of] non-Indians who deal with
Indian tribes and their members and [the management of] the United States'
relations with Indian tribes... ,,126 The first category of non-Indians who deal with
Indians would include litigants before tribal courts, most clearly all non-Indian
plaintiffs, and defendants where the underlying cause of action is contractual in
nature. Hence, this sentence might suggest that a statute dealing with the crossboundary effect of tribal court judgments would come within this narrower plenary
power. And the second category of intergovernmental relations with the tribes could
support a statute dealing with the enforceability in the other direction, if tribal
recognition of state court judgments falls within the rubric "the United States'
relations with Indian tribes," which it may. This theme is restated in the last passage
I quoted above, where Professor Clinton stated that "the exercise of congressional
Indian commerce authority is limited to nonmembers subject to federal authority
who deal with tribes and to the management of federal relations with the tribes,"
though here we are required to interpret "federal relations with the tribes" to include
state relations as well, for most cross-boundary enforcement
actions are going to
127
involve tribal and state courts, not tribal and federal courts.
Still, there remains this blunt assessment: "Consistent with the original American
constitutional tradition, the federal government can secure power to directly regulate

124. See supra notes 93-98.
125. Professor Clinton recently published a new article on Full Faith and Credit, see Robert N. Clinton,
Comity and Colonialism: The Federal Courts' Frustrationof Tribal-FederalCooperation, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. I

(2004). However, that article assumes away the issue here discussed in the margin:
While the author and others have criticized the history, basis, and rationale of the so-called
federal Doctrine of Plenary Power over Indian Affairs, finding it inconsistent with both
constitutional language and democratic theory [citing, among other sources, "There Is No
Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes"] the modem case law unquestioning[ly] adheres
to the doctrine and for that reason alone, the author has chosen to assume its existence here for
purposes of argument only.
Id. at 26-27 n.62.
126. Id.
127. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997), is to the contrary, but that was the unusual case.
See Robert Laurence, The Role, IfAny, for the Federal Courts in the Cross-Boundary Enforcementof Federal,State
and Tribal Money Judgments, 35 TULSA L.J. I (1999).

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 34

Indian tribes or their members only through exercise of the treaty power."' 28 Now,
contained in this quotation lies a substantial measure of asymmetry. Consider first
the question of whether Professor Clinton would allow the Congress to enact a
statute requiring state courts to give Full Faith and Credit to tribal court judgments.
The quoted sentence surely does not prohibit such a statute, for while it would have
an impact on tribes, it would not "directly regulate" them. There would still be the
question of whether such a statute would be permissible under the Full Faith and
Credit clause of the Constitution, but from Professor Clinton's earlier analysis of
section 1738, I presume that he would perceive nothing objectionable about such a
congressional enactment. Justice Scalia might disagree.
Now consider the enforcement of a judgment in the other direction and the
question of how the quoted sentence would apply to a federal statute requiring tribes
to enforce state judgments. This would seem to me to be the very kind of direct
regulation of Indian tribes that Professor Clinton thinks can only be done via
treaties, and without the agreement of the affected tribes, Congress could not compel
such recognition and enforcement of off-reservation judgments. The principles set
forth in "There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes" may-and I
stress may-in the end compel Professor Clinton to abandon the notions of
symmetric Full Faith and Credit that he has championed so eagerly in the past.'29
And if Congress would react to its inability to force Full Faith and Credit on the
tribes by declining to force the states to give Full Faith and Credit to tribal
judgments, then, again, we would very likely end up with an asymmetric situation,
as each jurisdiction decided for itself what its own rules would be. Asymmetry, in
fact, may be the only kind of cross-boundary enforcement regime that will stand up
under Professor Clinton's recent theory.
But perhaps not. There may be one other way to apply the narrow plenary power
of "There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes" to the cross-boundary
enforcement debate that would allow a symmetric Full Faith and Credit regime to
stand. This application is suggested by the opinion of the Cheyenne River Sioux
Court of Appeals' decision in Eberhard v. Eberhard.30 The court's per curiam,
written (I suspect) and influenced (for sure) in large part by Justice Clinton,
advanced the proposition that the application, there, of the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act, 13' and, in dicta, section 1738, to require a tribal court to recognize
a state court judgment does not diminish the tribe's sovereignty. Wrote the court:
While there is considerable force to these arguments and this Court would
normally agree with the Tribe that any Congressional curtailment of tribal
sovereignty requires a clear and express showing of Congressional intent, the
Court is convinced that Congress intended the PKPA to apply to tribal courts as
a means of integrating them, and other courts, into the cooperative federalism
framework of the national union. Furthermore, this Court believes that this
conclusion does not diminish tribal sovereignty, as suggested by the Tribe, but

128.
129.
130.
131.

Clinton, No Federal Supremacy Clause, supra note 14, at 239.
See supra text accompanying notes 23-29.
24 Ind. L. Rep. 6059 (Cheyenne River Sioux 1997) (per curiam).
28 U.S.C. § 1738(A).
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rather, protects tribal sovereignty and the right of self-government of the Lakota
32
people in many instances.
33
Chief Justice Pommersheim agreed in a special concurring opinion.1
3
4
As set forth in detail elsewhere, I think this analysis will not stand close
inspection: For Congress to require a tribe to recognize an off-reservation judgment
without inquiring into whether it is consistent with on-reservation norms is to limit
tribal prerogative and to diminish tribal authority. Such a diminishment may be
worth the price if what the tribe gets in return is the recognition of its judgments offreservation, but the value of that political bargain is best made by the political
branches of the tribe's government, not by its courts. 35
Having written in Eberhard--or at the very least having agreed to its being
written-that the imposition of a Full Faith and Credit regime on tribal courts is not
a diminishment of tribal sovereignty, Professor Clinton may well now think that his
newly explicated narrow plenary power is no barrier to a congressionally mandated
Full Faith and Credit statute. The question from that perspective would be, I guess,
whether Congress retains broad constitutional powers to legislate without tribal
consent if Congress, rather paternalistically, one would say, determines that it is in
fact fostering tribal sovereignty, but that Congress loses that broad power to act
when it forthrightly seeks to limit tribal power. There is little in "There Is No
Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes" to suggest that Professor Clinton sees
this kind of asymmetry at work in the Framers' construction of the Constitution,
and-he would surely not agree with this observation-Eberhard itself shows
exactly why that kind of one-way plenary power would not work. If the Court of
Appeals of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe could convince itself, in the face of
objections from its own tribe, that the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act restricts
tribal latitude but advances tribal sovereignty, then the same reasoning could be used
by another court to uphold, say, the Indian Civil Rights Act, 3 6 the Indian
1 7
Reorganization Act,

the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,'38 or any of a myriad of

congressional enactments that restrict tribal latitude.
In the end, I suspect-but only suspect-that Professor Clinton will, consistent
with Eberhard,find section 1738 a constitutional enactment even under his narrow
plenary power. Perhaps he will stick to his notion that section 1738, on balance,
advances tribal sovereignty. Or perhaps he will argue that it regulates "nonmembers

132. Id. at 6064.
133. Id. at 6068 (Pommersheim, J., concurring).
[T]he inclusion of "tribes" within the meaning of "State" in the PKPA in no way demeans tribal
sovereignty but rather takes it to another and quite appropriate level. This is the level where
tribal courts are treated with the same dignity and respect accorded state and federal courts
within the national system of law and jurisprudence. Indeed, such a doctrinal regime bespeaks
a true sovereign equality under enduring principles of law.
Id.
134. Robert Laurence, Full Faith and Credit in Tribal Courts: An Essay on Tribal Sovereignty, Cross-

Boundary Reciprocity and the Unlikely Case ofEberhard v. Eberhard, 28 N.M. L. REv. 19 (1998).

135. Id.
136. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2000).
137. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2000).
138. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701 etseq.
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subject to federal authority who deal with tribes"'139 in one direction, and "manage[s]
federal relations with the tribes" in the other. 40 However, the tremor remains, and
the cross-boundary enforcement debate henceforth must take into consideration the
possibility that, under a narrowly defined plenary power, Congress may be unable
to accomplish any result other than to leave the tribes and states alone to do as they
will with each other's judgments.
IV. WHAT IF THEY ARE BOTH RIGHT? BOTH WRONG?
AND OTHER PERMUTATIONS
The tremors, then, are two: Justice Scalia's Hicks dicta that state court judgments
may be enforced on-reservation by county sheriffs without going through tribal
court process and Professor Clinton's new-he would say "old"-plenary power
that would be so limited as to prohibit Congress from passing a Full Faith and Credit
statute applicable to tribes.
If they are both wrong in their speculations, then the system we have now
remains: sheriffs may not execute judgments on-reservation, so off-reservation
judgment creditors must use the tribal court enforcement process, and vice versa.
Congress has the power to require either, or both, court systems to recognize the
cross-boundary judgment, and to impose either a symmetric or an asymmetric
solution on the states and tribes. Our comfortable debate continues.
If they are both right, the entire structure of the present system collapses. County
sheriffs may enforce state judgments on-reservation, tribal officers may not enforce
tribal judgments off-reservation, and Congress may well be without the power under
the narrow plenary power to fix this situation, short of the re-institution of treatymaking with the tribes. Add the Hicks holding' to the supposed correctness of
Justice Scalia's dicta,'42 and tribal courts lose much, if not all, of their civil
adjudicatory authority over non-Indians. This will reduce substantially the number
of tribal judgments that need to be enforced off-reservation. The tribe ends up with
largely unfettered power to adjudicate the civil controversies among its own
members, but little else, and states get to treat on-reservation land pretty much as if
it were indistinguishable from off-reservation land.
If Justice Scalia is right, but Professor Clinton is wrong, then off-reservation
judgments are directly enforceable on-reservation by county sheriffs. Congress
might be persuaded to step in under the present, anti-Clintonian, broad plenary
power and legislate to prevent that result. Various recent congressional enactments,
mentioned above, show a Congress reasonably willing to respect, indeed nurture,
tribal justice systems, a Congress that might well be persuaded to enact legislation
to reverse the Hicks dicta. For that matter, as I mentioned above, Congress might,
under careful persuasion, even be convinced to reverse the entire Oliphant-to-Hicks
line of cases, or part of it, and leave us with a system in which both tribal and state
courts adjudicate matters arising within their respective territories. Judgments, then,

139.
140.
141.
142.

Clinton, No FederalSupremacy Clause, supra note 14, at 254.
Id.
Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364.
Id. at 361-62.
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would cross reservation boundaries for coercive enforcement, when needed, under
a congressionally mandated regime, which might be either symmetric or asymmetric
depending on the wisdom of Congress, influenced by the advocacy of the tribal and
state lobbyists.
If Professor Clinton is right, but Justice Scalia is wrong, then federal law is
largely removed from the equation, at least federal statutory law. Neither side's
judgments are directly enforceable on the other side of the line, and Congress is
largely on the sidelines, unable to legislate with respect to tribes, without reinstitution of treaty making. It is up to each government whether to show respect for
the cross-boundary sovereign by enforcing foreign judgments. State-to-state, tribeto-tribe, differences would emerge. Some states and tribes could be expected to
establish warm relations, some cold. In some places, creditors with judgment-proof
debtors would be common, in other places rare. In some places, the ability to keep
one's property beyond the reach of one's creditors would be easy, in other places,
hard. Such a system is chaos, or acceptable diversity, depending on one's
perspective. Certainly, to one who teaches the bankruptcy course, the idea that
advancing the nation's interest via the establishment of a large group of judgmentproof debtors is old-hat, as is the extreme diversity that presently exists from one
state to the next regarding how much of a debtor's property is exempt from
judgment."'
It is possible that the picture is more complicated than this. For example,
Professor Clinton's theory might be that Congress has the power under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution to require the states to enforce tribal
judgments, but not, under his narrow plenary power, to require the tribes to enforce
state judgments. It is possible, too, that Justice Scalia would react to such a state of
affairs by even more aggressively moving to restrict tribal court civil jurisdiction
over non-Indians, thereby largely mooting out the question of state recognition of
tribal judgments. Or the opposite: Justice Scalia might decide that Congress has the
broad plenary power to require the tribal courts to give Full Faith and Credit to state
judgments, but that the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which does not mention
Indians, does not allow the Congress to impose recognition requirements on the
states. 44
However these parameters work out, the tremors caused by the shifting of the
foundation of the cross-boundary enforcement debate will reverberate in the law
reviews for some time to come.
V. CONCLUSION
I would like very much for no reader to be thinking that which I suspect some are:
"Scalia and Clinton: Strange bedfellows." They are not. Their hearts are not in the
same place, nor even close; their proximity is not intimate, indeed it is almost
143. For example, in Arkansas, a married debtor's homestead is protected in bankruptcy up to one-quarter
acre in town regardless of value, 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) and ARK. CONST. art. 9, § 4, and million-dollar homesteads
are not unknown. In New Mexico, on the other hand, homesteads are limited in value to a more tight-fisted-and,
I must say, more reasonable-$30,000, NMSA 1978 § 42-10-9 (2003).
144. The Full Faith and Credit Clause states that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State...." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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happenstance. Professor Clinton is, and always has been, one of the strongest
scholastic advocates of tribal sovereignty, truly deserving of the accolades that he
has received, and one of the very small handful of people who may legitimately
claim to be the leading Indian law scholar of his, and my, generation. I think that he
has made a few mistakes along the way-Eberhardwas one of them-and I believe
that the doctrine of tribal sovereignty would be healthier today if Professor Clinton,
and most of the other Indian law scholars extant, had "learned to live with the
plenary power" and had urged Congress to act thereunder to stop or divert the
Oliphant-to-Hicks line of cases. The easiest way to have done that, I continue to
believe, was to have made the Indian Civil Rights Act a workable tool to allow
federal court collateral review of tribal civil process. Such a compromise would not
have been highly principled, and it might not have worked, but it is hard to believe
that we would have been worse off for trying than we are now. These tactical, as
opposed to doctrinal, mistakes notwithstanding, Professor Clinton remains solidly
within the ranks-indeed at the head of the ranks-of tribal advocates.
Justice Scalia is in a different bed and is here to destroy tribal sovereignty, not
protect it. When I am confronted by the gratuitous destruction of tribal selfdetermination found in Nevada v. Hicks, I am tempted, I will admit, to sink into a
self-righteous depression. Approaching the end of my career, that temptation
becomes almost irresistible. I understand at last the supposed depression of the old,
old Williston, watching "his" contracts edifices tumble. 145 If it is not pretty to watch,
it is worse to live, trust me.
Governments hundreds, even thousands, of years old are slipping away, done in
by the hands of the Supreme Court of a young, brash, and headstrong newcomer,
very much full of itself these days as "The World's Only Remaining Superpower."
Under a common law of its own making, a common law unaffected by-worse,
unconcerned with-the modern wisdom of the political branches of government,
this Supreme Court piece-by-piece removes the foundations of self-government,
barely bothering to explain itself, ostentatiously citing as authority withdrawn
solicitor's opinions and outdated texts full of theories rejected by their authors. The
conclusion that they just do not care is hard to avoid.
There have always been those who celebrate the demise of tribal government, and
there always will be. One can only hope that such celebrations will be subdued. I
will not join in the celebration. I have in the past tried to make the most of cases that
have gone against the tribes; I have famously admitted that I can live with the
plenary power of Congress; I have tried to read the bad cases narrowly and proposed
grand bargains that were not mine to propose. But not here. Nevada v. Hicks is
wrong, and its dicta are ten-times wrong. It is not just wrong, it is monumentally
wrong, and the smirking character of Justice Scalia' s opinion does not make it right;
it makes it even more wrong. It makes it offensive, that not being too strong a word.
So, no bedfellows are these two, not by a long shot. I have grouped them uneasily
together here because both of their recent excursions into what might be are related
to the on-going debate over the cross-boundary enforcement of judgments. That
seems to have been neither writer's intention; their purposes were not to remake the

145. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
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debate over the cross-boundary enforcement of judgments. Over the years, this
debate, especially as it applies to money judgments, has been largely a mundane
one, but it is one that raises as well as any the mysterious questions of American
Indian law: of difference and respect for difference, of power and the exercise of it,
and of sovereignty, its elevation and its destruction. The debate has been shaken by
the writings of Justice Scalia and Professor Clinton and now we shall see what lies
ahead.

